Defamation law has traditionally occupied a position of overwhelming dominance in the vindication of the right to reputation. Nevertheless, liberalization of this legal framework including through the Defamation Act 2013 has led to a concern that, when analysed from a fundamental rights perspective, "gaps" in the protection provided for natural persons may have emerged. In this new context, there has been a renewed focus on whether data protection may fill the potential lacunae. Data protection law contains a number of important limitations and exceptions and its jurisprudence has been both limited and sometimes confused. Nevertheless, this article argues that its broad purpose and complex structure ensure it will play a significantly augmented role in the future, especially in actions against website operators facilitating the dissemination of information posted by a third party, the publication of opinion or where either injunctive relief or the correction of inaccurate information is sought (in particular in cases of continuing online disclosure).
INTRODUCTION
There is a widespread belief that London is the "libel capital of the world" and that both European and American defamation laws afford "better protection for media defendants". 1 Nevertheless, for over a decade, English defamation law has been evolving in a more free speech friendly direction. The Nevertheless, and importantly, particular laws may differ as to whether they place on claimants a requirement to prove any such inaccuracy or whether, absent sufficient contrary evidence, this is simply presumed. Moreover, statements of opinion may also be published which, although clearly impacting on reputation, are intrinsically incapable of being either accurate or inaccurate. An example would be asserting that somebody is a "depraved" individual. In such cases, criteria other than truth or falsity must be used to determine the statement's legality.
Irrespective of whether the statements in question are ones of opinion or alleged fact, there is also a consensus that the right to reputation is in necessary and fundamental tension with the right to "receive and impart information and ideas", 10 a key aspect of another central value within Western society, namely, freedom of expression. A reconciliation between these values is, therefore, necessary. Lord Steyn provides a useful summary of the various rationales for according freedom of expression strong weight:
Freedom of expression is, of course, intrinsically important: it is valued for its own sake. But it is well recognised that it is also instrumentally important. It serves a number of broad objectives. people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they can in principle seek to influence them. It acts as a brake on the abuse of power by public officials. It facilitates the exposure of errors in the governance and administration of justice of the country.
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The seminal importance of freedom of expression is recognised in the fact that it is set out as a stand-alone fundamental right within both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 12 aggravated and punitive damages may also be awarded. 29 The generosity of defamation awards was also related to the fact that claimants in defamation actions were historically entitled to a jury trial "unless the court is of the opinion that the trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made by a jury". 30 If a jury is appointed then it has the responsibility of setting any award of damages in the first instance.
Although much of the core of defamation is stringently formulated, the law also includes important limitations which have been widened over time. reputation has already been noted. Secondly, turning to the relief obtainable, under the rule in
Bonnard v Perryman, 31 the court is essentially prevented from granting an interim injunction so long as the defendant contends that a defence of the words will be mounted at the full hearing. Moreover, even before the abolition of a right to jury trial in the Defamation Act 2013, Court of Appeal control of excessive jury awards has not only always been possible but such control had been strengthened as a result of both legislation and case law. 32 Thirdly, legal aid has never been available in defamation actions. Moreover, whilst introduction of Conditional Fee Arrangements (CFAs) in the 1990s did increase opportunities for individuals to pursue a remedy in defamation, there is increasing pressure to prevent the additional costs of these agreements (namely 'success fees" and after-the-event insurance)
being passed on to the losing side. 33 Fourthly, in recognition of the potential "ʻchillingʼ effect" of its "rigorous, reputation protective principle"
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, defamation law has long included a range of defences at both common law and in statute. Some of these provide absolute protections such as when parliamentary 35 or UK court proceedings 36 are being reported. Similarly, defendants are also free to disseminate opinions so long as these are based on facts which are both true and at least implicitly referred to, are held honestly and, prior to the Defamation Act 2013, involved a matter of "public interest". 37 Both these latter concepts have been defined liberally. Thus, an opinion will still be "honest" if it can be said that some honest or fair man "however exaggerated or obstinate his views"
would have made the statement. 38 Meanwhile "public interest" was interpreted as covering any matter which the public at large "may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at".
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Other defences to a defamation action are qualified in that they may be defeated by the claimant demonstrating that the defendant's dominant purpose was to use a privileged occasion for an 31 shield for storing information provided by a recipient of an information society service. 52 In sum, within defamation law, the balance between the right to reputation and freedom of expression has significantly shifted in favour of the latter. As will be seen below, this trend is continued in the Defamation Act 2013.
C. Data Protection
If assessing the contours of defamation law presents difficulties in light of the recent enactment of the wide-ranging Defamation Act 2013, then any analysis of data protection law poses even greater challenges. These challenges stem not only from the complex interface between national and European law in this area but also, as Lord Justice Leveson recently noted, from the reality that "[t]o say that it [data protection] is little known or understood by the public, regarded as a regulatory inconvenience in the business world, and viewed as marginal and technical among practitioners (including our higher courts) … is perhaps not so far from the truth". 53 It nevertheless remains true that "the subject matter of the data protection regime… could hardly be more fundamental to issues of personal integrity, particularly in a world of ever accelerating information technology capability".
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In contrast to defamation law, data protection is of recent origin. It emerged globally in the 1970s from a belief that without a new system of regulation, the rise of new forms of information technology (notably computerised processing) would pose an unacceptable threat to the rights and whom he has no effective control". However, such publishers must demonstrate that "took reasonable care in relation to its publication to its publication" and "did not known, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement". 51 In Godfrey v Demon Internet [2001] Q.B. 201 an Internet Service Provider (IPS) sought to rely on this defence in relation to the republication of an anonymous posting made on a United States-based newsgroup. However, the defence was struck out on the basis that the defendant had not removed posting on notice and, therefore, had inter alia failed to reasonable care in relation to it. 52 See Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 (SI /2013 . This "hosting" shield only applies if upon obtaining knowledge of illegal activity or information, or even facts or circumstances from which such illegality is apparent, the provider "acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information" (para. 19 (a) (ii)). See also the related defences for mere conduit (para. 17) and caching (para. 18). 53 interests of natural persons. Whilst protecting privacy was a principal concern, it was far from the only value which seen to be under threat by these new developments. Instead as the German Data Protection Act of 1977 stated, this law was to ensure against all "Mißbrauch" of personal data in order to "der Beeinträchtigung schutzwürdiger Belange der Betroffenen entgegenzuwirken". 55 The French
Data Protection Act of the same year required that information technology "ne doit porter atteinte ni à l'identité humaine, ni aux droits de l'homme, ni à la vie privée, ni aux libertés individuelles ou publiques". 56 Rather more prosaically, the Council of Europe Convention on the subject finalised in 1981 simply stated that its purpose was to secure for every individual "respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy". 57 The EU Data Protection Directive 95/46, which was designed to "give substance to and amplify" the Convention's provisions, essentially mirrored this objective referring specifically to the protection of "the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy". 58 Although the reference in both the Convention and the Directive to rights and freedoms may be thought to limit the purposive scope of these instruments, it should be stressed that these terms were construed extremely Whilst the philosophical origin of data protection was rooted in lofty and wide-ranging human rights concerns, its subsequent spread was strongly related to concern that without harmonization of law in this area "trade would be fettered" as "information could not flow freely" between nations.
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Thus, a number of countries drafted their data protection law principally out of a pragmatic concern to ensure compliance with transnational frameworks ensuring the free flow of data. 65 Formally defined as "equipment operating automatically in response to instructions given for that purpose" (DPA, s. 1(1)).
within a structured manual filing system. 66 Thus, all information, whether in the form of words, sounds or images, will be data if included on a computer, mobile phone or digital camera. As the Court of Justice of the EU found in Criminal Proceedings against Lindqvist, even placing material on an unstructured internet page constitutes a processing of data. 67 Meanwhile data will be personal so long as it "relate[s] to a living individual" who is directly identified or who is identifiable. 68 This is wide enough to cover any information which is clearly about an individual, irrespective of whether this concerns private, professional or business life. 69 Published information, arguably even if as seemingly anodyne as the name of author coupled with a book title, 70 is also not excluded. Any "expression of opinion" about the individual is also specifically included. 71 Finally, it is the "data controller" who must generally ensure compliance with the data protection stipulations. This is defined as any "person who (either alone or jointly or in common with other persons) determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be processed. 72 As a result of a specific exemption in both the EU e-Commerce Directive 2000 In substantive terms, all data controllers must generally ensure that processing complies with eight data protection principles 75 which stipulate inter alia that personal data be processed "fairly", 76 within the DPA are sufficiently tailored to the defence of specific rights or freedoms so as to benefit from this provision. After all, at the time of adoption of the Directive, the Council and Commission adopted a Statement for the Minutes stating unequivocally that "the derogation … does not refer to rights such as the right to carry out data processing". 105 In any case, the CJEU has consistently held that any exemption must comply with the "requirement of proportionality with respect to the public interest objective being pursued" and that the "national court must also interpret any provision of national law, as far as possible, in light of the wording and the purpose of the applicable directive, in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter". 106 Even in relation to processing solely for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and/or literary purposes, 107 the court has argued that exemptions may be provided "only in so far as strictly necessary" 108 to achieve a balance between fundamental rights. The CJEU has further held that the domestic processing exemption, which is absolute in nature, can only be relied upon in relation to "activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people".
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D. Malicious Falsehood
Although this article is principally concerned with a comparison of defamation law with data protection law, it is necessary finally to note briefly the contours of malicious falsehood, a traditional cause of action which, although little used, is related to the protection of reputation. This tort protects against dissemination of a statement to somebody other the claimant of information which is false.
The information need not have any tendency to lessen respect for that person but, unlike in defamation, the claimant must prove the relevant falsity. 110 In addition, the claimant must demonstrate actual, pecuniary damage or, alternatively, that the words either "are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff and are published in writing or other permanent form" or "are calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff in respect of any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the of publication". 111 Finally, and most significantly, the claimant must prove "malice". 
A. Defamation Act 2013
The Defamation Act 2013 arose from the initiative of a law reform coalition concerned that the current law on defamation was unduly curtailing freedom of speech. 118 The Act's substantive reforms of relevance to this article are the introduction of a 'serious harm" threshold, 119 the crafting of new statutory defences of truth, 120 honest opinion 121 and publication on a matter of public interest 122 and the introduction of various new defences to defamation, most notably that applicable to "website operators". 123 By crafting a new 'single publication rule" 124 the Act also makes an important procedural change to defamation law. In addition, the right to a jury trial in defamation actions is abolished.
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As the explanatory notes to the Act makes clear, the new statutory defences of truth and publication on a matter of public interest are largely codifications of the existing common law justification (truth) and "Reynolds" defences. 126 However, the other changes are potentially much more significant. Firstly, section one of the Act establishes that a publication will not be defamatory unless it has caused or is likely to cause 'serious harm to the reputation of the claimant". 127 This stipulation reverses what has traditionally been seen as a cardinal principle of English law, namely that libel be actionable per se. 128 It is true that the Court of Appeal in Jameel did strike out a defamation claim for abuse of process due to its failure to disclose a "real and substantial tort", 129 and also indicated that changes in the Civil Procedure Rules and the introduction of the HRA had rendered the court willing to take this, albeit still very rare, step more readily than in the past. 130 Moreover, in
Thornton v Telegraph Group Tugendhat J held that defamation law "must include a qualification or threshold of seriousness, so as to exclude trivial claims". 131 Nevertheless, Thornton remains a very recent decision at first instance 132 and, overall, it is clear that this new section "raises the bar" for bringing a defamation claim in the future.
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123 Defamation Act 2013, s. 5 (provision for a new defence to defamation action brought against operators of websites), s. 6 (qualified privilege in relation to peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals) and s. 7 (provision for qualified or absolute privilege in relation to a range of either verbatim or summarised reports). 124 Defamation Act 2013, s. 8. 125 Defamation Act 2013, s. 11. 126 As regards the latter, the wording that the defendant need only have "reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest" (s. 4 (1) (b)) may be thought to have widened the defence by introducing a greater subjective element. However, the Government (which proposed the wording) was clear that "the intention in this provision is [merely] to reflect the existing common law as most recently set out in Secondly, turning to the clause dealing with "honest opinion", many of the details of this new statutory defence merely consolidate the current common law defence of "fair comment" which it replaces. Nevertheless, this restatement comes on the back of the Supreme Court's expansive reading of this latter defence in Joseph v Spiller. 134 There, the court found that the potential to defeat the defence by showing "malice" had been 'significantly narrowed". 135 In particular, it was in no way relevant whether the defendant had been "motivated by spite or ill-will". 136 Rather, it was only necessary that the comment was honestly held, based on true facts which were indicated (even if only implicitly and in general terms) to the receiver of the message and finally was on a matter of "public interest". Whilst the court found that the scope of the latter requirement had been "greatly widened", 137 this last requirement nevertheless imparted a critical objective element into this defence.
Importantly, however, the new statutory defence entirely removes this "public interest" produced by any legislature or governmental body as well as reports of proceedings at a wide range of public meetings. 142 A specific qualified privilege defence is also set out for the first time in relation to the publication of peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals. 143 By far the most significant new defence, however, is that provided to any "operator of a website in respect of a statement posted on the website" 144 where it did not itself post the statement. These entities have a complete shield from liability unless the claimant demonstrates that it was not possible for him to identify the person who did post the statement, the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint and the operator failed to respond in accordance with the Defamation (Operators of Websites)
Regulations 2013. 145 Where the operator has no electronic means of contacting the poster, these regulations require that to benefit from the defence the operator remove the statement within 48 hours of receiving notice. 146 In other situations, however, the operator only needs to notify the poster stating that the statement may be removed unless the operator receives a written response from the poster stating that he does not wish the statement to be removed and providing his full name and postal address. 147 The operator has to remove the material from the website 48 hours after the end of the period in cases where the poster fails to respond 148 or where the poster's response is incomplete.
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The latter does include situations where a "reasonable website operator would consider the name or postal address … to be obviously false". 150 However, in all other cases, the operator need only inform the complainant in writing within the same period that the poster does not wish the statement to be removed and that the statement has not been removed. 151 So long as the poster has not consented to the release of his name and/or address, the operator must simply notify the complaint in writing of that fact.
in the broader context which relate directly to the role of data protection in protecting reputation. The case law will first be considered before briefly examining this broader context.
Quinton v Peirce
Although there has been a greater recent focus within domestic law on the interface between data protection and the right to reputation, not all of the cases have been supportive of a significant role for the DPA in this area. In fact, declined "to interpret the statute in a way which results in absurdity".
by the "fine and arbitrary distinctions" which the DPA appeared to require, distinctions which to him illustrated the "confusion and uncertainty attending the application of these legislative provisions".
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Overall, it may be argued that Quinton "is an illustration of what happens to a data protection claim to which an English court has reacted unsympathetically, particularly when it is brought before a court unfamiliar with data protection issues and concerned to fit them into a familiar pattern of wellknown torts, defamation and malicious falsehood". 
Clift v Slough Borough Council
The other main English cases in this area have all centrally involved the participation of Tugendhat J who, as just mentioned, has long been on record as supporting a far more expansive interpretation of the data protection regime than that articulated by Eady. 216 As a result, the Court held that "[i]nasmuch as the activity of a search engine is … liable to affect significantly, and additionally compared with that of publishers of websites, the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data, the operator of the search engine … must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that the activity meets the requirement of Directive 95/46 in order that the guarantees laid down by the directive may have full effect and that effective and complete protection of data subjects, in particular of their right to privacy, may actually be achieved." 217 Not only its purpose, but also data protection's substantive requirements were interpreted expansively. In particular, the judgment stressed that (unless excused by specific derogations in national law justified under Article 13 of the Data Protection Directive) data controllers had to ensure that personal data are processing fairly and lawfully, that they are adequate, relevant and not excessive and that they are accurate. It was particularly emphasised that "even initially lawful processing of accurate data may, in the course of time, become incompatible with the directive", 218 an understanding which may prove especially helpful to an individual wishing to get removed, or at least deindexed, statements especially of opinion rather than fact which are having an ongoing negative impact on their reputation. It was stressed that not only was it not necessary for the data subject to prove that the processing "causes prejudice" but that, in light inter alia of the fundamental right to data protection set out in the EU engine but also the interest of the general public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data subject's name". 219 Finally, as regards the concrete claim at issue, the court found that Costeja had established ʻa right that the information should no longer be linked to his name by means of such a listʼ.
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Broader context
This burgeoning data protection case law has been mirrored by broader developments which have also is not finally pursued before the CJEU, both the depth and breadth of these concerns suggests that UK courts may have wide-ranging obligations to expansively interpret the DPA in order to ensure, as far as possible, that proper effect is given to the Directive which it is meant to implement.
Secondly, in late 2012, Lord Leveson published his report on press regulation, produced as a result of an inquiry commissioned by the Government in July 2011. The report gave prominence to data protection, expressing criticism both of the current legislation and of the timid approach taken to it by legal practitioners, the higher courts 222 and most particularly the Information Commissioner that it also "took a wider view of the ICO's functions in relation to journalism than it was minded to take itself". 224 For the future, Leveson proposed significant reform of both the Information Commissioner's approach and the legislative framework. Regarding the former, Leveson recommended that the ICO take immediate steps "to prepare, adopt and publish a policy on the exercise of its formal regulatory functions in order to ensure that the press comply with the legal requirements of the data protection regime", 225 that it likewise "prepare and issue comprehensive good practice guidelines and advice on appropriate principles and standards to be observed by the press in the processing of personal data" 226 and finally that it "publish advice aimed at individuals (data subjects) concerned that their data have or may have been processed by the press unlawfully or otherwise than in accordance with good practice". 227 Meanwhile, as regards the DPA itself, Leveson recommended that the exemptions provided for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and literary purposes be significantly narrowed including in particular removing all of the special limitations on the requirement to ensure the accuracy of personal data. 228 He further recommended that it be made clear that compensation under the DPA be generally available for pure distress 229 and that the procedural restrictions on the courts issuing injunctions and the Commissioner using his enforcement powers in relation to the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and literary purposes 224 ibid, 1107. It should be noted that in Kordowski actually rejected the proposition that the website Solicitors From Hell could benefit from the DPA's special protections for processing for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and literary purposes (s. 32). Whilst acknowledging that "[t]oday anyone with access to the internet can engage in journalism at no cost", it also found that the "[j]ournalism that is protected by s. 32 involves communication of information or ideas to the public at large in the public interest" (at [99]). It is certainly true that the DPA requires that the data controller has a reasonable belief that publication is the public interest to benefit from s. 32's substantive protections (s. 32(1)- (2)). This requirement was clearly not met in this case. As regards the procedural protection from injunctive relief, however, s. 32 only expressly requires that the data controller claims or it appears to the court that processing is only for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and/or literary purposes and with a view to the publication of material not previously published by the data controller twenty-four hours previously (s. 32 (4)- (6) Although the Government initially committed to consulting on the Leveson's recommendations for legislative reform, 232 this has not been forthcoming and it seems unlikely that significant statutory change will ultimately eventuate. In contrast, following both the Kordowski judgment and the Leveson Report, the ICO has been engaging in a process of reanalysis of its stance vis-à-vis free speech issues. Related principally to the former, in May 2013 the Office published new guidance on social networking and online forums. 233 In stark conflict with the CJEU's holding in the Lindqvist case (see above), this guidance maintained the Office's former position that as a result of the DPA's "domestic purposes" exemption, individuals "who have posted personal data whilst acting in a personal capacity" would not themselves need to comply with the DPA's data protection principles in any case. 234 On the other hand, the Guidance also held that, additionally to any responsibilities they had under inter alia defamation law, 235 social networking and online forums were themselves data controllers subject to the DPA including in relation to information posted by either individual or corporate third parties. 236 Such websites therefore had a duty to take "reasonable steps to check the accuracy of any personal data that is posted." 237 Even in relation to forums where the vast majority of site content is posted by third parties, the volume third party posts is significant and the site is not premoderated, the guidance suggested that "reasonable steps" would include having clear and prominent policies for users about acceptable and non-acceptable posts, having clear and easy to find procedures in place for data subjects to dispute the accuracy of posts and ask them to be removed and responding to disputes quickly and having procedures to remove or suspend access to content, at least until such time as a dispute has been settled. 238 Finally, as regards non-factual posts, the guidance added that policies must also be in place that are sufficient to deal with "complaints from people who believe that their personal data may have been processed unfairly or unlawfully because they have been the subject of derogatory, threatening or abusive online postings by third parties". 239 This broad understanding of the scope of the data controller responsibility vis-à-vis corporate online actors who play an active role in the facilitation of information dissemination originating from others has clearly also been vindicated in Google Spain, a judgment which the Office also welcomed.
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Meanwhile, in January 2014 the ICO published its draft guidelines on data protection vis-à-vis the media. 241 Although acknowledging that the s. 32 provision for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and literary purposes was "one of the broadest exemptions", 242 the draft guidance also stressed that to benefit from s. 32's substantive protections the data controller must prove a reasonable belief as to both the public interest of publication and also as to the incompatibility of 238 Information Commissioner's Office (note 233), 13-14. Seemingly as an alternative to the stipulation to remove material, the guidance states that the site "might wish to set up a mechanism which allows it to add a note to a post indicating that a data subject disputes its factual accuracy". The ICO's position nevertheless remains that "it will be probably be more practical for the site to simply remove or suspend access to the dispute post in this type of situation" (14). In any case, following the interpretation of "reasonable care" established in relation to the Defamation Act 1996 in Godfrey v Demon Internet, it would appear that if the data subject presented clear evidence that the information processed was in fact inaccurate, the data controller would not have taken "reasonable steps" unless any note made clear that this was indeed the case. 239 compliance with general data protection principles. 243 Most significantly, these requirements were interpreted strictly vis-à-vis accuracy:
The DPA requires you to record details correctly and take reasonable steps to check your facts.
You should also clearly distinguish between fact and opinion, and if the individual disputes the facts you should say so. … We would not expect you to fall back on the [s. 32] exemption very often, as it is hard to argue it is in the public interest to publish inaccurate stories without making reasonable checks. Such concerns, which partly arise from the weakening of this law as a result of jurisprudential developments, will become more acute under the Defamation Act 2013. These developments, therefore, raise anew the question of whether data protection law can fill at least some of these potential protection "gaps" in the future.
A. Perceived Gaps in Protection
It is possible to locate a range of substantive and procedural limitations under the reformed law of defamation which are likely to prove irksome to a potential claimant. The key limitations, most of which were discussed in detail in the previous two sections, may be briefly summarised as follows.
At a substantive level, defamation law will now provide no redress for publication of even a 243 ibid, 23. 244 ibid, 38.
manifestly inaccurate statement unless this "has caused or is likely to cause serious harm" 245 to the standing of applicant vis-à-vis "members of society generally". 246 Defamation also includes an expanding range of defences, particularly as regards communication on a privileged occasion, which will generally defeat any action. Moreover, in relation to factual statements, in those cases where defamation law provides for a full defence other than truth, it does not even provide for partial redress in the form of a declaration of falsity. This limitation has become more serious since Reynolds provided for a broad defence for publication to the world which was not dependent on the accuracy of the statements made. Thus, a "wrongly libelled reputation" may be "left besmirched" under current defamation law. 247 In addition, the Act's new defence of "honest opinion" will allow for the broad publication of defamatory comment about purely private persons without any need for show a "public interest". 248 The breadth of the Act's new defence for website operators is of greatest concern.
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This will leave claimants powerless to hold a wide range of online actors responsible under defamation law not only when they release the name and address of the original poster but even in cases where the claimant must obtain, undoubtedly at considerable expense, a court order to secure such details and, most worryingly, even when these details later turn out to be inaccurate and perhaps useless. The law also includes a special provision requiring that claims in defamation be brought within the "relatively short window" 253 of one-year. 254 Although historically the effect of this provision was curtailed by rules allowing the founding of an action based on any re-publication of a statement, the Defamation Act 2013's introduction of a 'single-publication rule" in many contexts ensures that this restriction will bite in a much wider range of cases. Finally, actions in defamation can be notoriously expensive, a fact which will increasingly trouble claimants if and when the reforms of Conditional Free Arrangements (CFAs) are commenced in relation to such actions. 255 
B. Can Data Protection Fill the Gaps?
At a purely conceptual level, it is possible to envisage data protection filling many of the gaps elucidated above. Turning to the substantive issues first, any inaccuracy, even if it alleges a state of affairs which would encounter no opprobrium within majority society, can in principle found an action under the DPA. There is also no over-arching requirement to demonstrate that 'serious harm" has resulted. Moreover, the courts" right, which applies even when inaccurate personal data has already been "rectified, blocked, erased or destroyed", to order the data controller "to notify third parties to whom the data have been disclosed" 256 of this inaccuracy, means that the DPA does provide for the possibility of a declaration of falsity. Thirdly, as signalled in Clift, the making of a statement of an occasion of qualified privilege does not absolve a data controller from compliance with the data of making a cost-free complaint to the Information Commissioner requesting that he deploy his extensive regulatory enforcement powers to provide redress.
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C. The Broader Context
Notwithstanding the clear potential outlined above, it is also necessary to take into account a broader context filled with a range of obstacles placed in the way of any claimant seeking to use data protection to vindicate reputation. Firstly, as outlined in section two, the DPA is replete with limitations and exemptions. Although these are almost always significantly qualified, they are wideranging. One important example is the special provision for the purposes of journalism, artistic purposes and literary purposes found in s. 32. This reality is reflective of the fact that the Act was generally designed to "implement the [Data Protection] Directive in the least burdensome way for data users". 263 As a result, there remain major uncertainties as regards when a court will actually find a violation of the Act, when and according to what metric compensation should be awarded and,
finally, in what circumstances a non-financial remedy such as rectification of data is available.
Although the legitimacy of many of these restrictions under EU law may be questioned, the effect of them on the domestic claimant is nevertheless very real. Secondly, again as noted previously, at least until recently, the English courts have generally adopted a narrow and even hostile interpretation of the DPA and even the Information Commissioner has also historically proved reluctant to support the deployment of the DPA in this area. Nevertheless, whilst the full extent of any shift remain unclear, in the wake of Kordowski, the Leveson Report and Google Spain there are signs that that data protection is being taken more seriously in this area, including by the Commissioner himself. Finally, there is the potential remedial flexibility of data protection including through the granting of injunctive relief as demonstrated in Kordowski. It seems therefore clear that claimants will increasingly seek to use DPA to vindicate their reputation in proceedings before both the courts and the Information Commissioner. Despite this, the legislative and other obstacles placed in the way of their success remain formidable. Consequently, although data protection will undoubtedly assume significantly greater importance in this area in the future, both the extent and precise modalities of this change remain more uncertain.
